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Migrants’ New Venture Evolution Under Institutional Voids: 
Lessons from Shonga Farms in Nigeria 
 
1. Introduction 
In the emerging and developing economies, transaction costs of doing business are high 
(Meyer et al., 2009; Marquis and Raynard, 2015). This is typically discussed utilising the label 
of institutional voids and it has been primarily applied to multinational enterprise (MNE) 
investment (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). Yet, as observed by Khoury and Prasad (2016), voids 
faced by other business actors, both domestic and foreign, may be different and more 
challenging.  This in turn makes ambitious forms of entrepreneurship and long-term investment 
difficult, especially where it matters most: in underdeveloped rural areas. Entrepreneurial 
success is an exception, and exemplars call for analysis. 
In our analysis, we utilise the lenses of transaction costs / institutional voids theory (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2010), combined with insights from emerging institutional strategies theory 
(Marquis and Raynard, 2015), to inductively build theory on the factors for success of 
development entrepreneurship (McMullen, 2011).  We base our research on a case study of the 
evolution of the unique and biggest foreign migrants’ development entrepreneurial 
involvement in Nigerian agriculture to date: Shonga farms. We posit that the key factors of 
success for the Shonga farms project were (i) initial conditions of long-term commitment that 
led to trust that was leveraged to new partners, (ii) the involvement of the regional government, 
(iii) the appropriate form of financial contract, and (iv) the gradual transition of controlling 
interests to private actors. Further, the project’s adaptability and capacity for evolution was a 
critical feature. These conclusions are supported and extended by a comparison with failures 
of similar migrants’ projects elsewhere. 
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We highlight the importance of both ex-ante and post-entry decisions from the perspective of 
transaction costs. We believe that some aspects of this inductive analysis may be generalisable 
to other developing economies, with practical value to businesses and governments. 
Accordingly, we answer the following research question: How were transaction costs and 
institutional voids overcome, resulting in the tangible business success in a challenging 
institutional context? 
Consistent with the transaction costs perspective, we posit that combining commitment with 
adaptability is critical (Williamson, 2007). The adaptability implies manoeuvring successfully 
in the context of bounded rationality and imperfect foresight and improving on the 
organisational design adopted earlier. Furthermore, the priorities of stakeholders could evolve 
during the nascent phase of the venture and changes in ownership structures should reflect 
these shifting priorities. However, a long-term commitment is also important as it provides the 
interested parties with guarantees against opportunism: the long-term implies that there are 
stronger sanctions for breaking cooperation such that future gains are lost (Williamson, 1985, 
2007). There could also be tensions between commitment and adaptability, and this is why 
effective organisational design is a challenge; especially under institutional voids. To 
understand how this can be achieved is one of the core motivations of this article.  
 Our focus on ownership evolution also implies that our analysis contributes to the literature 
based on property rights theory perspective (Driffield et al., 2016). We argue that as such 
entrepreneurial ventures become more secure and transaction costs are overcome, government 
involvement can decrease, whilst other corporate interests can increase. This is a new 
perspective; it focuses on turning points at which ventures suffering from liability of 
outsidership (Fiedler et al., 2017), no longer require special government involvement and are 
ready for private-dominated investment. Furthermore, we argue that the host country 
administration stakeholders cannot be reduced to a uniform actor labelled as the government. 
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Instead, we ascertain the effects of the transition from central to regional government’s 
involvement and engage with the market-preserving-federalism literature (Montinola et al., 
1995).  
The article proceeds by introducing the elements of theory framework. We then introduce the 
case study, explain our research methods, move to the inductive theory building, and formulate 
conclusions. We validate and generalise the latter by comparing our main case study to similar 
ventures that have failed, and then summarise by highlighting the key theory insights. 
 
2. Theoretical Foundations 
2.1.  Transaction Costs and Institutional Voids 
Consistent with the transaction cost framework, firms create governance structures that 
minimise the inefficiencies associated with both operating domestically and entering into 
foreign markets (Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1989). The literature leads 
naturally to the concept of institutional voids, i.e. the context-defined high transaction costs 
commonly found in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). The concept of voids does 
not imply lack of any institutional order, it is more specifically related to the absence of 
institutions that support markets (Mair and Marti, 2009: 422). In other words, the transaction 
costs are higher both for market exchange (Khanna and Palepu, 2010), and for new firm entry. 
These voids relate to political and economic systems, trade policies, and product, labour, and 
capital markets (Khanna et al., 2005). They imply the absence of specialised intermediaries, 
regulatory systems, and contract enforcing mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Khanna et 
al., 2005; Liou et al., 2016; Meyer et al., 2009).  
Likewise, the transaction cost theory emphasises the value of complex organisational forms 
(Riordan and Williamson, 1985). What is less explored however is how such non-standard 
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forms of hybrid investment and ownership structures arise to fill institutional voids. These 
forms are often difficult to categorise; case study methodology may therefore be the 
appropriate, feasible starting point. Moreover, both the ex-ante contractual arrangements, and 
any ex-post, post-entry ownership changes are of interest. The latter are driven by both 
evolving firm-level characteristics and by their complementarity with the features of the 
country-specific institutional environments (Driffield et al., 2016; Liou et al., 2016).  
 
2.2. Institutional Voids and Foreign Migrants’ Entrepreneurship 
As noticed by Khoudry and Prasad (2016), institutional voids are typically considered in the 
context of MNEs, but this view overlooks the reality of other cross-border investments and 
does not pay sufficient attention to underdeveloped regions, as the latter are not often the focus 
of MNE activities. Migrants also engage in entrepreneurship (Ram et al., 2017), and migrants 
representing South to South (in contrast to North to South) movements may be specially placed 
to understand and overcome local institutional voids. Yet even though migrant entrepreneurs 
face the liability of outsidership (Fiedler et al., 2017), they could also be disadvantaged in terms 
of financial, human, and social capital (Riddle et al., 2010). 
The literature agrees that migrant entrepreneurs contribute significantly to their host nations, 
generating income, employment, innovation, and larger economic outreach (Rath and 
Schutjens, 2015). Due to the liability of outsidership, they often enter into partnerships with 
host country nationals (Meyer et al., 2009). This implies diversity of stakeholders at time of 
entrepreneurial inception, and therefore leads to the question of how these entrepreneurs create 
effective governance structures. However, the literature on migrant entrepreneurship in 
developing countries (Crush et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018), has not yet explored how migrant 
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entrepreneurs in such circumstances could engage with organisations or indeed create 
organisational forms to overcome institutional voids. 
More generally, the transaction costs analysis is a tool that can help us to understand the 
arrangements that support sustainable, value-generating organisations in developing 
economies. We contribute to this literature by investigating a hybrid form of public-private 
partnership involving migrant entrepreneurs in Nigeria that became successful in an adverse 
environment. If we follow Qureshi et al. (2016) terminology, we may label such new 
organisational forms as institutional entrepreneurship. 
 
2.3. Institutional Voids and Institutional Entrepreneurship 
McMullen (2011) sees institutional entrepreneurship overlapping with development 
entrepreneurship for which enhancing economic growth is an objective. The actors involved in 
institutional/development entrepreneurship may be those representing political elites with 
access to resources (Eisenstadt, 1968), non-for profit non-governmental independent actors 
(Mair and Marti, 2009), or profit seeking entrepreneurs (McMullen, 2011). As we will 
emphasise, not only are such projects more likely to be accomplished when there is a broad 
coalition of stakeholders acting together, but also such coalitions function well when they 
become embedded in specific organisational forms. In particular, hybrid organisations can be 
formed when different entrepreneurial actors bring distinct institutional logics into the 
entrepreneurial process (Dufays and Huybrechts, 2016; Manev et al., 2015). 
 We see institutional entrepreneurship as belonging to the wider category of institutional 
strategies. The latter are defined by Marquis and Raynard (2015) as “the ways in which 
organisations purposefully and strategically shape their institutional environment to enhance 
their competitive advantage” (Ibid.: 292). These strategies can be classified as relational, 
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infrastructure-building, and socio-cultural bridging (Ibid.: 291). What typically distinguishes 
entrepreneurs executing these strategies is bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005): entrepreneurs 
finding out and organising resources from a limited local set. The term bricolage is used to 
describe how entrepreneurs “make do” by applying combinations of resources at hand to new 
problems and opportunities. It is particularly relevant for development contexts characterised 
by severe resource constraints. It has also been seen to have implications for entrepreneurial 
finance (Fraser et al., 2015), social innovation (Shaw and de Bruin, 2013), technology (Garud 
and Karnøe, 2003), and social entrepreneurship (Mair and Marti, 2009). 
Institutional entrepreneurs gain support, acceptance and legitimation of new institutional 
arrangements, following one of three distinct processes: leverage, accumulation, or convening. 
Leverage means that politically skilled actors mobilise support and acceptance (Rao, 1998), 
accumulation implies that support and acceptance emerge as the uncoordinated actions of a 
large number of actors and probabilistically converge (Van de Ven and Garud, 1993), and 
convening suggests institutional change jumpstarted by the creation of collaborative 
arrangements (Lawrence et al., 2002). Entrepreneurs could also compensate for institutional 
voids by using context-specific contracting (Armanios et al., 2017; Khoury and Prasad, 2016), 
which we will next illustrate with our case study.  
 
3. Introduction to Shonga Farms 
The Shonga Farms venture can trace its roots back to year 2004 when President Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe introduced the land reform program that dispossessed many white farmers. Thirteen 
of the farmers were invited to Nigeria by the Kwara state government to engage in a farming 
project. Initially, the project involved the Kwara state government in Nigeria, thirteen farmers, 
and the Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB). The 
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venture has evolved over time, and while the Kwara state government and the Zimbabwean 
migrant farmers have remained involved, the NACRDB has exited the venture, while five 
Nigerian commercial banks and, finally, several local and foreign private investors came on 
board.  
Shonga Farms are engaged in poultry, dairy, and mixed farming. At the time of writing, they 
employ up to 4,500 and 7,000 workers in off-peak and peak agricultural periods respectively, 
and have the highest cassava yield in Africa. Two of the country’s biggest food processing 
firms (Nigeria Starch Mill and Nigeria Flour Mills) are at present sourcing their cassava 
supplies from Shonga Farms. The farms also supply dairy and poultry produce to key shopping 
malls and processing factories within Nigeria.  
Shonga Farms is the biggest migrants’ entrepreneurial involvement in Nigerian agriculture 
(Nnabuko and Uche, 2015). The thirteen farms are located in Tshonga district, under Edu local 
government of Kwara, as illustrated by Figure 1. The migrant farmers reported that one of the 
reasons they selected Shonga as a place to situate the farms, was because it lies on the flood 
plain, with some farms as close as 200 metres to the river Niger. Compared to other states in 
Nigeria, Kwara also has a robust road network.  
{Figure 1} 
While the physical conditions for this venture appear attractive, the institutional ones do not. 
The Nigerian government is characterised by corruption, mismanagement and indiscipline 
(Adegbite, 2015); this can be interpreted as the resource curse (Collier, 2016; Porter and Watts, 
2016), with deep political, social and normative roots. It has disadvantaged Nigeria and resulted 
in inefficiency, poverty, inequality, and violence (Collier, 2016; Watts, 2005). It is therefore 
surprising that a non-oil-focused business project of this magnitude, involving migrant 
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entrepreneurs has been efficacious. To understand the success enjoyed by Shonga Farms is to 
understand how specific governance solutions counterbalanced these institutional voids.  
 
4. Methodology 
The methodology we employ involves inductive case study research applied in order to 
develop new theoretical insights (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). We relate to phenomenon-
driven case selection (Fletcher et al., 2018), recommended when there is insufficient theory, 
chiefly due to a complex, unexplored or underexplored phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007), such as foreign migrants (South to South) new ventures. More generally, following Mair 
and Marti's (2009) insights, we see institutional voids as more complex settings, in contrast to 
low-transaction costs environments where the basic rules of the game are clear. 
 Our choice of Shonga Farms is motivated by its success in the institutional voids context. 
We inductively engaged in theory building, with the aim to develop testable propositions and 
theory that can be generalisable across contextual settings (Poulis et al., 2013; Welch et al., 
2011). In addition, our phenomenon-driven case study research allows for critical cases to be 
reviewed using replication logic so that revelatory insights can be made (Fletcher et al., 2018). 
We will attend to this, via a subsequent analysis of other cases studies similar to Shonga Farms.  
In particular, we utilise interviews with the key stakeholders, supplemented by published 
materials, to investigate how the organisational aspects of the new venture were developed in 
response to the institutional voids. More specifically, that includes: (1) the clear distinction 
between the formative (ex ante) and subsequent (ex post) phases of Shonga Farms 
development, as emphasised by the transaction costs approach (Williamson, 1985); (2) 
attention to the perceptions, and declared objectives of stakeholders involved in the Shonga 
Farms scheme, and how these evolved; and finally: (3) the comparative method, again 
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consistent with the transaction costs approach (Williamson, 1985): exploring what 
differentiated Shonga Farms from other similar migrants’ farming schemes that copied it. This 
phenomenon-driven inductive theory building pathway is illustrated by Figure 2.  
{Figure 2} 
As shown by Figure 2, an advantage of the project was that we conducted two rounds of 
face to face interviews, first in 2007 in the initial stage of the project, and then ten years later, 
when the project was mature. That way we did not need to rely on retrospective testimonies. 
The interviews were with the migrant farmers at Shonga Farms, and the government 
administrators tasked with managing government interests in the public-private partnership. 
We interviewed these actors separately in their roles as key informants, so as to ensure 
honesty without undue influence (Fletcher et al., 2018). To get a holistic view of the venture 
however, we also included historical, official and media reports. Last but not least, we also 
distributed questionnaires to indigenous community members and to farm workers on-site. 
The topics covered in our interviews aimed to discover how the Shonga Farms venture 
transformed over time, and the change in the role of the government, the indigenous 
community, and the commercial banks. We also took on board the views of critics of the 
venture and peer-reviewed journal articles (Mustapha, 2011; Nnabuko and Uche, 2015), and 
investigated some points raised by them in our second round of interviews. 
All our interviews were recorded, transcribed and included in a database. The coding 
followed an iterative approach to revisiting and categorising the data with regard to emerging 
categories (Fiedler et al., 2017). In the next phase, we focused on causal explanation and 
contextualisation. In the final phase, we inductively built theory from the findings showing 




5. Inductive Theory Aspects Derived from the Case Study 
We will now proceed to derive our theory in an inductive way. We will start with the evolution 
of the financial and ownership arrangements before moving on to the role of the government. 
Next, we will discuss how ownership change followed the changes in relative contribution of 
shareholders, and local integration and legitimacy. Finally, we will explain how the evolution 
in the wider environment affected Shonga farms. 
 
5.1.  Evolving Financial Arrangements Secure Key Commitments  
In response to the institutional voids, Shonga Farms adopted a form of public-private 
partnership (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015), a governance structure that sustained cooperation 
between the Zimbabwean migrant farmers, the local community, financial institutions, and the 
regional government. More specifically, to finance the start-up of the farms, NACRDB loaned 
the migrant Zimbabwean farmers $5 million, serviced by the Kwara state government via an 
Irrevocable Standing Payment Order (ISPO), under the name of Kwa-Zimbo Enterprises, in 
2006. Each of the thirteen migrant Zimbabwean farmers received a 25-year lease of 1,000 
hectares of land from the regional government. 
However, it turned out that the initial fixed-claim finance arrangement was based on an 
unrealistically short time horizon assumed for the new migrant ventures to become profitable. 
The migrant Zimbabwean farmers were unable to service their loans and the NACRDB 
threatened to execute the ISPO. At this stage, the Governor of Kwara state, Bukola Saraki 
stepped in and through his networks, arranged refinancing, first with two Nigerian commercial 
banks (Guarantee Trust Bank, and Intercontinental Bank), and then with three more (FinBank, 
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United Bank for Africa, and Unity Bank). These banks provided $6.6 million as equity and 
advanced another $6.6 million as loans (Mustapha, 2011; Nnabuko and Uche, 2015).  
It is important to note that the NACRDB is a central government institution. Yet, the 
institutional setting had some characteristics of market-supporting federalism (Montinola et al., 
1995), with the federal decentralised constitution of the country providing space for local 
stakeholder agencies, thus enabling the project to succeed by drawing upon local interests in 
the critical phase when the bank threatened to liquidate the project. This way, local stakeholders 
were able to modify the initial form of finance. 
As a result, Shonga Farms Company Limited was incorporated as a public-private limited 
partnership. In this new venture, Shonga Farms Holdings Limited - jointly owned by the Kwara 
statement government (25%) and the banks (75%) – in turn owned 60% of the shares in each 
of the farms, with the migrant Zimbabwean farmers owning 40%. Overall, there was majority 
representation of commercial interests over political interests since each of the thirteen farms 
was jointly owned by the farmers, banks, and Kwara state government in the ratio of 40%, 
45%, and 15% correspondingly, as of 2010. 
However, the ownership structure evolved further. The banks bought out a further 5% of 
equity from the regional government and the ownership structure became: migrant 
entrepreneurs-farmers 40%, banks 50%, and Kwara government 10%. Focusing on this phase, 
we find a new alignment of key interests. At this stage, the commercial banks were satisfied as 
to the credibility of the capabilities of the migrant entrepreneurs-farmers and to the 
commitment of the government, learning from repeated interactions (Qureshi et al., 2016), and 
were willing to invest further. The banks’ increased involvement also had the effect of helping 
to weed out corruption threats because while corruption notoriously thrives within the Nigerian 
government bureaucracy (Adegbite, 2015), banks are required by law to perform rigorous 
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checks and must publish their annual financial statements. They must report to their 
stakeholders and meet stringent legal requirements, resulting in a measure of accountability.  
However, the migrant farmers needed more finance to expand. The new ventures now had 
stability and reputation, and as a result, private investors felt encouraged to participate. This 
has resulted in private investors acquiring between 5% and 50% of farms’ equity. This third 
wave of investment into the businesses has allowed the farmers to buy machinery and the other 
factory processing equipment needed for expansion and upgrade to higher value-added 
activities. For instance, one of the migrant farmers explained to us (2017): 
 
“What we need is to be able to process our agricultural output into finished goods and sell 
to the Nigerian market, then we can think of exporting. We need private investors now as the 
government and banks are not helping, although their presence helped us initially.”  
 
While the initial involvement of the government attracted the banks, in turn the reputation 
and goodwill of the commercial banks was key to bringing in investors. Despite evidence of 
political muscling on the part of the Kwara regional government to secure the funding from the 
commercial banks in the first instance, these financial commitments were largely viewed as 
legitimate because the banks still had discretion as to whether to invest or not. It is interesting 
to note that the interest rates given to Shonga Farms were lower than the prevailing interest rate 
in the country at the time (Mustapha, 2011; Nnabuko and Uche, 2015).  This preferential 
treatment not only helped to reduce the financial costs involved in the project, but also served 
as a signal to other private investors who saw the banks as shrewd investors, implying that 
Shonga Farms was worth investing in.   
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The banks themselves had a business motive for giving lower interest rates since that helped 
to keep the venture afloat, consequently protecting their equity. Moreover, the commercial 
banks could provide additional banking services to business entities doing business with 
Shonga Farms, as well as services related to export and import. These agreements would of 
course be lucrative to the banks compensating for lower interest rates. 
 
5.2.  Initially Proactive Government that Remains a Partner  
In the early phase, the government initiative led to a cooperation with the commercial banks 
and resulted in a provision of finance to get the business off the ground. Yet continued regional 
government involvement in the venture provided an additional security of investment 
(Mustapha, 2011; Nnabuko and Uche, 2015). This  involvement lasted long enough, even if 
gradually, the government lost genuine interest in the venture, as a migrant farmer explained 
to us (2017): 
 
“The government has been very short-sighted concerning this project. There is a lot of talk 
in the media but not much is being done just a lot of shaking of heads. They talk about giving 
us funds and support, but we can’t access it. We’ve had to bring in other investors and this is 
the way forward. If not, we will go under.” 
 
With the role of the regional government reduced, ownership evolved to include other 
investors. This ownership evolution effectively supported and combined the productive foreign 
know-how of the foreign migrant farmer-entrepreneurs with local bank finance. In addition, 
the regional government offered transaction services which facilitated access to resources and 
offered protection from expropriation. Later on, commercial success from the venture attracted 
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private investors. Corporate and private interests are quick to recognise the benefits of investing 
in a firm that enjoys political patronage (Tangri, 1999), and the Shonga Farms case is parallel 
to private entrepreneurs in China that developed the “red hat” strategy whereby firms disguised 
their private ownership by registering as a public-owned organisation instead of as a private 
firm (Chen, 2007). Shonga Farms was registered as a public-private development firm to 
benefit from government patronage while being under private management. We see further 
functional similarity between alleviating the threats of direct expropriation (as in China at the 
time of the early reforms) and alleviating the threats of gradual expropriation by corruption and 
extortion (as in Nigeria at the time of Shonga farms’ investment).  
At the same time, the gradual withdrawal of government support is not necessarily a bad 
outcome. As observed by Fiedler et al. (2017), under institutional voids, local private business 
partners often adopt persistent entrenched mediation strategies, acting as gatekeepers between 
foreign entrants and other local partners. The government could play such a role, but did not. 
To summarise, the venture has had three ownership structure phases as presented at Figure 3. 
{Figure 3} 
A deeper factor contributing to success lay in a degree of plasticity in the way the key 
stakeholders saw their roles, and this relates to the government agents particularly. A lack of 
plasticity in the respective roles of key actors – central government, local government and 
business actors – often constrains the creation and growth of public-private institutions 
(Fuentelsaz et al., 2018). Our analysis suggests that while an active government role was 
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necessary in the initial stage, the government had to be seen remaining involved later in a more 
passive way, to signal security of investment to commercial players.  
 
5.3.  Ownership Evolution Follows the Relative Contribution of Shareholders 
The percentages of equity assigned to the partners in Shonga Farms came under public 
scrutiny because of fears of corruption: specifically, that government funds used to set up the 
venture could be diverted to private coffers. As documented by our interviews, there were also 
rumours during the initial phase of the venture that the farms were actually owned by the past 
governor; this claim was refuted by the farmers and government administrators we interviewed.  
The ownership structure of the venture in terms of specific percentages is shown in Figure 3. 
There are two characteristic features of the ownership structure evolution. First, the share of 
the government diminished. Second, private investors participated in the later stages. In the 
initial phase, large commercial banks took on the role of investment banking, as the finance 
was too risky for smaller individual investors. Once Shonga Farms became more established 
however, the initial risks were alleviated, the reliance on commercial banks diminished, and 
private investors stepped in. As one of the migrant farmers explained to us (2017): 
 
“At first, we had the government and then the banks as good partners, but the government is 
currently doing nothing, and the interest rates offered by the banks are too high. The thing is 
farming is a long-term venture that requires a lot of effort. We needed to bring in private 
investors, some local, but many from abroad, who could give us funds for more profitable 
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activities like processing our crops at reasonable terms, so the business does not die; things 
are hard, you know.” 
 
Another migrant farmer also explained to us (2017): 
 
“This is a beautiful place for farming, but we can’t do much. We need factories to process 
our produce. This will help not just our farms but all the other farms around here. We need $6 
million now but the government and banks are not interested so maybe we have to go with 
private investors at this stage. We are evolving but if we don’t do this, we might have to leave.”   
 
We may also observe that while we identified the local community as an important 
stakeholder, it has never been represented in the ownership and governance structure of the 
venture. This is consistent with Williamson's (1985) argument that stresses that although local 
interests matter, the high transaction costs involved with transforming them into board 
representation often means they are not represented in ownership and governance structures as 
a result of their fuzzy and dispersed nature.  
More generally, Driffield et al. (2016) argue that it is important to start the international 
business micro enquiry with the question “what is best for the joint venture (JV)?” rather than 
“what is good for each partner?” since JV gains can be shared.  This is a perspective that 
originates from questions on the efficiency of organisations, stemming from the transaction 
costs theory (Williamson, 1985). In this context, property rights theory stresses that it is optimal 
for ownership control to rest with those who have the greatest impact on the value of the venture 
(Meyer et al., 1992). Driffield et al. (2016) argue that ownership structure follows the evolution 
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in the value contributed by each partner, this explains why in our case the share of the 
government decreased.  
 
5.4.  Local Legitimacy and Support Enhanced by the Government 
Initially, local tensions rode high on the issue of the land allocation to the migrant farmers for 
Shonga Farms, leading to the police being called to settle disputes on three occasions. As a 
result, a further cost in terms of security was incurred.  
Nevertheless, our interviews revealed that the farmers and the indigenous population 
gradually developed friendly relations. A key factor in this was a package of local community 
benefits provided by the regional government. The state’s provision of communal 
infrastructure, particularly transport and electricity infrastructure, coupled with additional 
classrooms for local schools helped. Gradually, the perceptions about the migrant farmers 
became more positive. In effect, the government was delivering the amenities it had promised 
the white farmers, which the local population needed too (Mustapha, 2011; Nnabuko and Uche, 
2015). For instance, an indigenous community member explained to us (2007):  
 
“Since this project has started, the situation in our area has improved. For example, we now 
have electricity, boreholes, good roads and even a clinic.” 
 
And one of the migrant farmers stated (2017): 
 
“Since we have been here, the local population has also been able to increase their 
agricultural output and you can see that many of them have now have motorcycles that they 
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didn’t have before. I have friends in Europe who say, <<you must be mad to stay in Nigeria>>, 
but I tell them, <<I don’t know what you hear on the news, but we don’t have any problems 
here.>> The level of support from the local community is excellent.” 
 
 This is consistent with the literature that highlights that when natural resources, like land, are 
being considered, support from the indigenous population is both vital and difficult to secure 
(May, 2010). Here, we highlight the role of the regional government, in line with the extant 
literature that recognises the need to focus on the sub-national territories to secure cooperation 
(Turok et al., 2017). The friction over land resources was exacerbated by the historical memory 
of whites in Africa (Moseley, 2013), however the Zimbabwean white farmers were far from 
stereotypical millionaire migrants (Gilmartin, 2012).  
 
5.5. Evolution in the Environment affects the Ownership Structure 
Finally, we consider the role of the evolving macro environment. A key developmental 
institutional void is that of finance (Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Liou et al., 2016). As discussed, 
this has been the main challenge for Shonga Farms both ex ante and after the project started. 
Interestingly, the shift from government stake holdings to private providers of finance was 
driven both by the development of the farms and by parallel changes in the wider environment, 
most notably in the form of macroeconomic reforms and banking consolidation. 
Driffield et al. (2016) argue that changes in the host country environment trigger adjustment 
in the ownership of the joint ventures. To consider this proposition, we will next give a brief 
account of how the business environment evolved in Nigeria at time of the Shonga Farms 





5.5.1.     Banking Reform Enables Finance.    A Nigerian bank consolidation exercise was 
launched in mid-2004. The Central Bank of Nigeria requested all deposit banks to raise their 
minimum capital base more than tenfold by the end of 2005. Banks failing to meet the 
requirements were expected to merge or else have their licenses revoked. Implementation of 
the consolidation scheme triggered mergers in the banking sector and reduced the number of 
deposit banks from 89 to 25. Moreover, in the process of meeting the capital requirements, 
banks raised the equivalent of about $3 billion from domestic capital markets and attracted 
about $652 million of FDI. As a result, many Nigerian commercial banks became players in 
the global financial market (Soludo, 2006). All this transformed the business environment, 
enabling the utilisation of the spare capacity in the economy (Soludo and Governor, 2007). 
Figure 4 presents a summary of these changes. 
{Figure 4 here} 
 
5.5.2.  Macroeconomic Stability Supports Investment.    The objective of the 
parallel macroeconomic reform, implemented prior and during the initial stages of Shonga 
Farms, was to stabilise the Nigerian economy by improving budgetary practices, and to provide 
a platform for sustained economic diversification and non-oil growth. A major challenge was 
to de-link public expenditure from oil revenue, which represent 90% of foreign currency 
earnings. An oil price-based fiscal rule was introduced. Any revenues that accumulated above 
the reference prices were saved in a special excess crude account (Soludo, 2006). This limited 
the transmission of external shocks into the economy.  
This resulted in a marked improvement in the government’s fiscal balance, with the previous 
deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 2003 turning into consolidated surpluses of about 11% of GDP in 
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2005. Over the period 2003 to 2006, foreign reserves increased by more than fivefold. Inflation 
declined from 21.8% in 2003 to 11.6% at the end of 2005. This could be contrasted with the 
Zimbabwean economy that was undergoing massive macroeconomic and hyperinflation crises  
(Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). 
 
5.5.3.  Democratisation Strengthened Regional Government.    Other significant 
institutional changes have occurred since the Nigerian governments’ return to democracy in 
1999. The Zimbabwean migrant farmers were invited right after the second round of 
democratic elections in Nigeria, following thirty-three years of primarily military rule. The 
elections in 2003 ushered the President Obasanjo administration in the second term, and were 
largely hailed by international agencies as being relatively transparent (Lubeck et al., 2007). 
These positive political signs were in sharp contrast to the tumultuous political conditions in 
the migrants’ home nation of Zimbabwe (Rutherford, 2004). 
Thus, the Shonga Farms’ project coincided with the second administration of Obasanjo (2003 
– 2007) who embarked on an economic reform program. It emphasised the importance of 
private sector development to support wealth creation and poverty reduction (Okonjo-Iweala 
and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007).  
Furthermore, regional autonomy contrasted with the centralising tendencies of the earlier 
authoritarian regimes. The new policies corresponded to market-supporting federalism 
(Montinola et al., 1995). They facilitated the evolution of the Shonga Farms project, creating 
conditions for Shonga Farms transitioning from being under federal control via the NACRDB, 





6.  Comparative Perspective on Shonga Farms: The Issue of Replication 
We now turn to a comparative perspective. Attempts have been made to replicate the success 
of Shonga Farms but this has proved difficult. At the time of writing, twelve years had passed 
since the Shonga Farms venture was set up, and one would expect that other states in Nigeria 
and indeed other African countries could imitate the initiative successfully.  
However, the enterprise has not been easy to replicate, as evidenced by projects involving 
other white migrant Zimbabwean farmers. These have been in Nassarawa state of Nigeria, in 
Mozambique and in Zambia. Next, we discuss these ventures in more detail. While, unlike 
Shonga Farms, we did not visit the other farms, we gathered information on them via a variety 
of data sources including historical, official and media reports, archival data, and journal 
publications. 
 
6.1.   The Nassarawa Zimbabwean Migrant Farmers’ Venture 
Zimbabwean migrant farmers were also invited to Nassarawa, a state with similar climatic 
and demographic characteristics, located to the east of Kwara state. It was hoped that the 
Nassarawa Farms would repeat the success of the Shonga Farms, but this has not happened. 
Firstly, the initial political patronage enjoyed by the Shonga farmers was nowhere to be seen 
in this case. There was no effort to build a complex, sustainable, hybrid system of public-
private migrant entrepreneurial partnership, supported by the government, with sufficient 
finance and security. In this scenario the only provision made to the migrant Zimbabwean 
farmers was a lease of 10,000 hectares of land, and there was no mention of finance designated 
to help the Nassarawa farmers, nor any plan to gain legitimacy with the local community by 
initiatives such as the training of indigenous farmers. 
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Furthermore, unlike the Shonga Farms where commercial banks provided funds both via debt 
and equity finance, the only funding source available to Nassarawa farmers was via debt. The 
farmers were left to themselves to persuade a bank to make a long-term loan. When a single 
bank (The United Bank for Africa Plc) finally decided to lend them some money, the rates 
fluctuated widely from 8% to 24%, even if the recommended bank rate during that period was 
meant to be 10%. In the end, the CBN stepped in to suggest a lending rate of 20%. Yet, when 
the lending documents were finally signed, the migrant farmers complained that it was a hassle 
to get the promised funds actually credited into their accounts. Of the eighteen Zimbabwean 
migrant farmers that started there, only one family remained at the time of writing. 
 
6.2.  The Zimbabwean Migrant Farmers’ Venture in Zambia 
Twenty-five white migrant Zimbabwean farmers resettled in Zambia, where they were 
welcomed by the national government. In this case, the newcomers were contract farmers 
financed by a $25 million loan from the US tobacco corporation, Universal. Here is an example 
of a scheme that seemed to be on the right track from the beginning because of the availability 
of sufficient and stable financing. Universal supplied the finance to buy vital equipment, and 
each of the Zambian farms employed about 120 local people, thus generating local support. 
However, while the macroeconomic conditions in Nigeria contributed to the stability of 
Shonga farms (Sections 5.5.1 - 5.5.2), the situation in Zambia was different.  The migrant 
farmers signed contractual agreements to supply set volumes of tobacco at fixed dollar prices 
to Universal Leaf Tobacco but when the local currency appreciated, and variable costs 
skyrocketed, the farmers were soon out of business due to their inability to modify the terms 
of their contracts. The key problem proved to be the inflexible contractual arrangements. 
24 
 
Furthermore, there was no support from a regional body for the scheme in times of economic 
distress.  
 
6.3.   The Zimbabwean Migrant Farmers’ Venture in Mozambique 
It is estimated that about two hundred migrant Zimbabwean farmers relocated to Mozambique 
for a Zambian style tobacco-growing scheme. This was sponsored by several tobacco 
companies, including Universal, whereby the tobacco companies provided start-up capital and 
seasonal loans. In return, the migrant farmers agreed to grow a set number of acres of tobacco, 
which they would sell to the tobacco companies (Aljazeera, 2015). The farmers at the 
beginning of this project also enjoyed political patronage from Governor Nhaca who was 
“always available on the telephone and would drop by unannounced for a chat” (Mustapha, 
2011).  
However, by 2008, the newcomers had fallen into debt and the tobacco companies were 
taking the farmers to court to seize their equipment. This resulted into about 85% of the migrant 
Zimbabwean farmers stopping their farming ventures, and the local workforce employed in the 
farms dropped from about 4,345 to 300 individuals (Mustapha, 2011). The farmers blamed two 
factors for their woes: (1) unrealistic targets set by the tobacco companies; and (2) 
Mozambique’s climate, which is both wetter and hotter than Zimbabwe’s and not as suitable 
for tobacco farming. It is worth noting however that the Shonga farmers also suffered some 
years of bad yield and had to change the crops they planted a few times while learning local 
climate and soil conditions. Thus, just as in the previous cases, the root of the problem seems 




6.4.    Comparative Summary 
Table 1 summarises all the migrant Zimbabwean farm case studies. It is clear to see that only 
Shonga Farms met all the conditions of public-private ownership and governance structures, a 
configuration that resulted in flexibility, alongside the provision of long-term security that gave 
the migrant farmers time to learn about the new environment. Community, financial, and 
political support was more complete in the Shonga Farms migrant entrepreneurial scheme. 
Crucially, only Shonga Farms exhibited the characteristics of the transition from central to 
regional government, and then to private interests. 
{Table 1} 
Our comparison offers some important policy lessons. We shall also note that the similar 
projects we discussed started too early to be able to take full advantage of the lessons learnt 
from the Shonga Farms’ experience. Yet despite this caveat, these failures indicate that the 
knowledge transfer between the government sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa remains limited, 
and this limitation exist within countries, as failure of the Nassarawa project in Nigeria 
documents. This also sheds some light on a potential gap in the theory of market-supporting 
federalism. It would appear that Nigeria met all the conditions enumerated by Montinola et al. 
(1995) to generate positive effects for cross-regional competition and learning from local 
experiments. Yet, we posit that the key limiting factor has been that despite the formal 
democratic processes within Nigeria, the country remained fragmented due to ethnically based 
politics that led to clientelism (Fukuyama, 2014), therefore shielding the regional governments 




7.  Discussion 
The migrant entrepreneurship literature is increasingly drawing attention (Crush et al., 2015; 
Liu et al., 2018). Although migrants can bring new knowledge to host countries, migrant 
entrepreneurship could differ in terms of impact and it is important to understand cases of 
success (Parker, 2018). We posit that the transaction costs perspective that underpins the 
institutional voids concept should play a more explicit role in this enquiry. The transaction cost 
perspective (and the related property rights perspective) results in a focus on organisational and 
ownership design, and on non-standard hybrid organisational solutions that should also be 
characterised by adaptability and flexibility (Williamson, 1985).  
Utilising McMullen’s (2011) terminology, the Shonga Farms venture can also be seen as an 
example of migrant developmental entrepreneurship, thanks to its positive impact on the local 
economy. It also has elements that could be replicated elsewhere. In our view, the failure of 
attempts at replication of the project was caused by an insufficient analysis of the important 
factors for success. Generally, the organisational angle remains underemphasised in the 
institutional voids literature. Furthermore, our contribution has been to highlight the 
importance of seizing opportunities triggered by changes in the context. However, ownership 
structures not only need to match the opportunities, they also need to evolve. Based on our case 
study and its comparisons, we delineate a model of successful operation for migrant 
entrepreneurial ventures that have developmental impact in the presence of institutional voids, 
which we summarise in Figure 5.  
Figure 5 draws attention to a few dimensions. We suggest that a long-term perspective and 
an appropriate choice of financial, ownership and contractual structure aids such ventures. We 
argue that the situation of institutional voids make the role of the government very explicit, and 
a solution based on an initial hybrid public-private ownership is an appropriate answer to the 
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institutional voids. At the same time, we argue that this structure needs to evolve with the 
development of the venture, and needs to seize upon opportunities emerging in the macro 
environment.  
{Figure 5} 
Our case study also shows how norms related to the possibility of cross-race cooperation can 
successfully be challenged and shifted. Likewise, negative norms and expectations of short-
termism and corruption can be questioned by an example of effective local government action. 
These wider effects may be as important as the direct economic impact of the project. We also 
find that replicating success has been difficult because of the configurational nature of the 
solution (Ragin, 2014): there are several necessary conditions as highlighted by our comparison 
of Shonga Farms to other cases. We find that the absence of one critical element implied failure, 
and what was missing was different in each case. All the key conditions needed to be met to 
breed success, as illustrated by Table 1. 
Yet this analysis has limitations. We compared only five projects, all located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Our results therefore need to be considered carefully before they can be generalisable; 
moreover, we cannot predict how these currently successful farms will perform in the future. 
Other aspects of transactions costs and migrant entrepreneurship in emerging nations also need 
attention and it might likewise be beneficial to investigate other ways to efficiently support 
migrant businesses in emerging market economies. 
 Despite these caveats, this analysis has wider practical and policy implications given the recent 
scale of forced and voluntary migration across the world. The human and entrepreneurial 
capital of migrants and refugees are valuable assets, and there is a risk that this could remain 
unutilised or underutilised in host countries. Thus, our approach is transferable to situations 
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where institutional voids exist and where developmental public-private partnerships involving 
migrant entrepreneurs may be considered.  
 
8.  Conclusions  
Taking the concept of institutional voids seriously led us to go back to its roots in transaction 
costs theory, and consequently to focus on organisation. As a result, our analysis sheds new 
light on the often neglected areas of organisation and ownership in developing economies. 
Specifically, we argue that the institutional voids situation implies that government has to be 
considered explicitly as an actor. It is always active as a player, and institutionalising its 
involvement in a form of public-private partnership helps both to secure its cooperation and to 
impose a clear framework limiting its arbitrariness, creating explicit commitment. In other 
words, using the transaction cost terminology (Williamson, 1985), it is an organisational device 
to limit uncertainty related to potential opportunistic behaviour. Hence organisation becomes 
the key issue, and therefore transaction cost perspective is relevant. Parallel to this, the political 
context, often ignored in developmental studies, matter. Conditions of accountability and 
decentralisation makes benevolent developmental activity of the government more likely. 
Furthermore, the organisation needs to evolve. The ownership structure of Shonga Farms 
changed such that as the venture became more secure, the government’s ownership stake was 
reduced, paving the way for other corporate interests. This evolution was gradual but involved 
a shift from government loans to commercial bank equity, and then to more private 
involvement. As Shonga Farms evolved, the liability of outsidership was reduced via trust 
(Fiedler et al., 2017). At the same time, although the government’s involvement diminished, it 
remained important in signalling security to other investors. Here, we advanced theory by 
focusing on organisational evolution and on the turning point at which a venture suffering from 
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the liability of outsidership in an emerging economy with institutional voids no longer requires 
special government patronage.  
In addition, our findings emphasise that the government is not a uniform, homogenous actor 
in its involvement. The regional branch of the government in this context was better aligned 
than the national branch with initiatives relating to local development. The involvement of the 
regional government also helped secure the cooperation of the indigenous population and build 
an environment of trust for the migrant entrepreneurs so that the initiative could thrive.  
In this article we also draw attention to three general dimensions. First, we posit that a long-
term perspective and an appropriate choice of financial, ownership and contractual structure 
aids such ventures. Second, we highlight the configurational nature of the solution (Ragin, 
2014). Third, following McMullen (2011) we see this as a model of successful development 
entrepreneurship adopting some aspects of institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy and Maguire, 
2017). The government and other actors involved in the developmental migrant 
entrepreneurship project exhibit characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship (Fuentelsaz et 
al., 2018; McMullen, 2011). A coalition of stakeholders acting together, became embedded in 
a specific organisational form to fill the institutional voids present in their environment.  
More generally, the findings have implications for entrepreneurial strategies in emerging 
market economies with institutional voids (Armanios et al., 2017; Dufays and Huybrechts, 
2016; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). By investigating this experience of institutional 
entrepreneurship overlapping with development entrepreneurship, our analysis reveals a hybrid 
pathway for public-private migrant entrepreneurial partnerships that could be replicated across 
similar emerging nations. It is our hope that the model of successful operation we have put 
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Private Investors Buying into Shonga Farms 
(2011 – Present) 
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(i) Regional State Government                        
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(iii) Private Investors 
Share of private banks increases (2007 - 2016) 
Figure 4. Evolution of Kwa-Zimbo to Shonga Farms Within Evolving Nigerian Business Environment 
37 
 




Table 1. Comparison of Migrant Farm Case Studies 
Key Factor  Migrant Farm 
 Shonga Nassarawa Zambia Mozambique 
Ownership Structure that Involved all Key Stakeholders Yes No No No 
Community Support Yes Somewhat Yes Yes 
Adequate Financial Support Yes No Yes Yes 
Initial Political Patronage Yes No Somewhat Yes 
Stable Macroeconomic Environment  Yes No No Somewhat 
Transitioning from Central to Regional to Private Interests Yes No No No 
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